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Abstract
The years following the 2008 global recession saw many 
liberal-democratic states respond to the economic crisis by 
introducing austerity policies. In turn, this provoked wide-
spread dissent and social movement activism involving 
large numbers of young people. In response, governments 
of many different political persuasions moved to suppress 
these actions by criminalizing political dissent. The article 
inquiries into state and institutional moves to suppress 
social movement activism like the ‘Maple Spring’ student 
strikes in Quebec, Canada, and the Indignados movement 
in Spain. While Canada can be described as a ‘mature lib-
eral-democracy’ and Spain might be better described as an 
‘emergent liberal-democracy’, both criminalized young peo-
ple exercising their democratic and constitutionally guaran-
teed rights to free expression and assembly by engaging in 
various forms of political protests. While some of this can 
be explained by reference to contradictions inherent in lib-
eral democracies, we consider if it also reflects certain long-
standing prejudices directed at young people. Young people 
have traditionally attracted disproportionate attention from 
police and legal systems when they are involved in ‘con-
ventional’ criminal conduct. What role if any did the ‘youth-
ful’ face of protest play in government moves to criminalize 
dissent in 2011-12? An account of the ‘civilizing offensive’ 
highlights the influence of ageist assumptions that ‘young 
people’ require close management. This provides some in-
sight into state responses to young people’s engagement 
in politics when it goes beyond the conventional mode of 
‘youth participation’ prescribed by states committed to man-
aging electoral party politics.
Keywords
Criminalization; Dissent; Liberal Democracy; Politics; 
Security; State; Young people.
Resumen
Las políticas de austeridad fueron la reacción de muchas de-
mocracias liberales ante la crisis económica iniciada en 2008. 
Esto provocó un aumento de la contestación y de la moviliza-
ción social, protagonizada en muchos casos por personas jóve-
nes. Como reacción a su vez, muchos gobiernos desarrollaron 
políticas con el objetivo de combatir estas formas de moviliza-
ción, incluyendo la criminalización de la protesta. Este artículo 
explora las prácticas por parte de instituciones y el Estado en-
caminadas a eliminar y criminalizar formas de activismo tales 
como las revueltas estudiantiles en Quebec, (la “maple spring”), 
o el movimiento de los indignados en España. A pesar de las
diferencias entre ambos países, Canadá puede ser descrito
como una ‘democracia liberal madura’ mientras España encaja
mejor con la etiqueta de ‘democracia liberal emergente’, en los
dos países se ha promovido la criminalización de las prácticas
de muchos jóvenes que buscaban ejercitar su derecho consti-
tucional de manifestarse y expresarse libremente a través de la
acción colectiva. Aunque en cierto sentido estas prácticas pue-
den ser explicadas atendiendo a ciertas contradicciones inhe-
rentes a las democracias, las políticas criminalizadoras también
reflejan algunos prejuicios muy arraigados contra las personas
jóvenes. Fundamentamos esta afirmación en el hecho que los
jóvenes han causado siempre una atención desproporcionada
por parte de la policía y el sistema de justicia legal cuando se
veían vinculados con formas convencionales de delincuencia.
¿Qué papel desempeñó en el desarrollo de políticas crimina-
lizadoras el hecho de que las protestas ciudadanas contra la
austeridad en 2011 y 2012 tuvieran un marcado componente
de protesta juvenil? La discusión sobre las ideas preconce-
bidas sobre la edad, y la creencia establecida entre algunos
sectores de la población de que la juventud ha de ser ‘vigilada
de cerca’ permite avanzar en la comprensión de las formas de
respuesta estatal cuando son las personas jóvenes las que as-
piran a participar activamente en la política.
Palabras Clave
Criminalización; Democracia Liberal; Disenso; Estado; 
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Since the late 1980s we have seen a variety of so-
cial movements opposing neoliberal ‘globalization’, 
with events in Paris (1989), Madrid (1992), Seattle 
(1999), Washington (2000, 2002) and Genoa (2001). 
We also witnessed anti-war protest campaigns oppos-
ing American-led plans to invade Iraq in March 2003. 
The global recession of 2008 was the source of politi-
cal-economic disruption in many countries, which neo-
liberal governments responded to with austerity mea-
sures. In turn, those policies generated widespread 
popular dissent manifest in anti-austerity movements 
across Europe (Grasso and Giugni 2015) including 
Spain’s Indignados, Greece’s Syriza and the French 
Nuit Debout movement. In these campaigns young 
people figured strongly. Added to this, we saw signifi-
cant student-led campaigns opposing the neo-liberal 
‘reform’ of universities across the globe (Pickard and 
Bessant 2017, Grasso and Bessant 2018). 
This article focuses on examining the experience 
of young people in Spain and students in Canada 
within this broader context to more clearly illustrate 
the processes at play. In Spain, a succession of gov-
ernments responded to the economic crisis of 2008 
by following the lead of many other countries by intro-
ducing austerity measures that imposed drastic cuts 
on public services and social benefits. These had a 
disproportionately negative impact on people on low 
incomes, those unemployed, and people on pen-
sions or reliant on government services. The austerity 
measures also led to widespread dissent expressed 
as social movement activism involving large numbers 
of young people globally (Grasso et al. 2017). 
In the cases of both Spain and Canada, young 
people were at the forefront of these actions. In 
Spain the Indignados mobilized substantial popular 
support. As Simsa and Barrequero-Diaz (2015:2) 
argue, the Spanish protest movement saw large 
numbers of people participating in rallies, marches, 
occupying city squares and creating social centers 
in abandoned houses. In Canada, student cam-
paigns were organized against increased university 
fees in Quebec, running in parallel with the Occupy 
movement mobilizing support in major cities across 
Canada in 2011-12. 
Governments in Canada and Spain moved quickly 
to suppress these actions. One of the ways they did 
this was by criminalizing young people’s political dis-
sent. State action involved the use of old and new 
legislation, as well as the use of traditional and often 
severe policing practices. Added to this were more 
novel intrusive and surveillance techniques. 
This article seeks to understand why the 
Canadian and Spanish governments took action to 
suppress the political participation of young people. 
We do this cognizant of the major problem that is 
posed when liberal-democratic states criminalize 
dissent, as well as the second problem posed when 
liberal-democratic governments do this while tar-
geting young political activists. 
On the one hand, Canada and Spain are both lib-
eral-democratic states ostensibly committed to rule-
of-law principles including support for rights such as 
the right to freedom of expression and assembly. 
Canada can be described as a ‘mature liberal-de-
mocracy’- an established western democracy, char-
acterized by a commitment to liberal-democratic 
principles. It is also committed to the rule of law, free 
elections, and the separation of powers of the dif-
ferent branches of government, as well as free and 
fair trade. In addition, Canada’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms, enshrined four decades ago, 
claims to protect freedoms including ‘thought, be-
lief, and opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of 
peaceful assembly and freedom of association’. As 
Alexander (2018) argued, freedoms of expression 
and peaceful assembly, found in Subsections 2(b) 
and 2(c) of the Charter are now considered ‘essen-
tial to the functioning of a free and democratic soci-
ety’ such as Canada. 
Spain can be better described as an ‘emergent 
liberal-democracy’, still coming to terms with a dark 
and not too-distant past of civil war, violence and 
authoritarian government.1 That domestic frame-
work is further supported by Spain’s membership of 
the European Union. Spain is also a member of the 
EU, itself a political entity that claims to be based on 
shared liberal-democratic values including basic hu-
man rights; the EU’s Strategic Framework and Action 
Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted by 
the Council of the EU in June 2012, secured rights 
such as the right of freedom of association and ex-
pression for everyone in the Union.
While there may be little surprise when authoritar-
ian or one-party states criminalize dissent, there are 
good reasons to be surprised when liberal democratic 
governments move to inhibit legitimate dissent. That 
is, if liberal democracies pride themselves on their 
commitments to civil liberties such as freedom of as-
sociation and democratic rights, such as the right to 
free and contested elections, then why, as Brabazon 
asks, ‘…would these states and their decision-mak-
ers not welcome social movements and dissent of all 
kinds as a natural part of the rich fabric of citizen par-
ticipation in decision-making?’ (Brabazon 2006:3).
This highlights a second problem. Apart from the 
ethos of liberal democracy, the Spanish and Canadian 
governments have also been promoting the idea that 
more young people should be actively participating 
in the political and civic life of their communities. This 
reflects official and popular concern based on consid-
erable empirical evidence of young people’s ‘politi-
cal disengagement’ from institutional politics (Grasso 
2016). In Canada in 2011 for example, only 39 percent 
of young Canadians cast a ballot, accounting for much 
of the general decline in voter turnout (Anthony 2016). 
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To address the problem of young people’s disen-
gagement from formal politics in Canada and Spain, a 
number of strategies were proposed and implemented 
which included more civic education, moves to low-
er the voting age, and the active encouragement of 
young people’s engagement in electoral politics. At the 
same time, governments in Canada and Spain aligned 
themselves with governmental and international agen-
cies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Economic Forum and the OECD, in recogniz-
ing social phenomena - including anti-austerity cam-
paigns, climate change campaigns and animal rights 
activism - as examples of young people’s disaffec-
tion, and significant threats to the political consensus 
(Lipton-IMF 2017; WEF 2017; OECD 2017).
In spite of the commitments to encourage young 
people’s political participation, in both countries large-
scale social action, much of it led and mobilized 
by young people, has been criminalized. Both the 
Spanish and Canadian governments moved to sup-
press expressions of these social movements. This 
process of criminalization relied on a combination 
of legislation, policing and surveillance, and a public 
relations campaign designed to stigmatize dissent-
ers. In Canada in 2010, hundreds of thousands of 
Canadians took to the streets in Toronto to peacefully 
protest the G20 Summit. During the Summit, a se-
nior Toronto Police Commander issued the order to 
‘take back the streets.’ Over 1,000 people including 
peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights moni-
tors and residents were arrested and placed in deten-
tion (McNeilly 2012, Chicoine 2018). In the spring of 
2012, Quebec college students initiated a widespread 
protest campaign including a general strike against 
the Liberal government’s plans to increase university 
fees. Legislators, police and the courts responded to 
Quebec’s ‘Maple Spring’ with multi-layered repres-
sion. This included new legislation, police use of pep-
per spray, stun grenades and rubber bullets, mass 
arrests of demonstrators, and the use of the courts 
to attempt to silence dissent and end the student pro-
test action (Chicoine 2018). Similarly, the Spanish 
government responded to anti-austerity protests in 
2012 by passing new laws on public security in 2014 
that restricted civil rights to demonstrate and protest, 
now generally referred to as the ‘Gag Law’.2 Amnesty 
International (2012) documented numerous cases of 
police violence against protesters, including the use 
of clubs and rubber bullets, leading to a formal de-
nunciation of Spain by the Council of Europe (2013). 
While it is true that young people play a major - but 
not an exclusive - role in these and similar movements 
(Calvo 2013), there are certain distinctive government 
responses to the ‘youthful’ face of protest in these two 
countries. We argue that what some scholars call the 
‘civilizing offensive’ helps to explain, in part, why it is 
that when young people engage politically outside of 
conventional forms of electoral politics, they are sub-
jected to excessive, hostile, even punitive responses 
from the state (Verrips 1987; Mitzman 1987).
This article can be read as an intervention into the 
fields of political science and youth studies, where 
there is already an extensive literature addressing 
the idea that young people have become politically 
disengaged (Henn 2002; Henn and Foard 2013; 
Bastedo 2014; Cammaerts et al 2014; Loader et al 
2014). Other scholarship highlights new forms of 
young people’s engagement, e.g. in social move-
ments (Altbach 2001; Della Porta 2009; Della Porta 
2017; Grasso 2016; Bessant 2016a; Bessant 2016b). 
This article also engages with criminalization studies 
(Ashworth 2009; Ashworth and Zedner 2008; Husack 
2008; Lacey 2004; 2009; Zedner 2009; Brown et 
al, 2011; McNamara et al 2018). As Michalowski 
notes, this field attempts to account for ‘the process 
by which behaviors and individuals are transformed 
into crime and criminals’ (1985:6). An inquiry into the 
criminalization of dissent poses new questions about 
the criminalization of liberal-democratic politics. Are 
Simsa and Barrequero-Diaz (2015:4) right when they 
argue that ‘the criminalization or the potential restric-
tion of peaceful activists is a dangerous signal not 
only for Spain, but also for the European Union’, and 
for democracy more generally? 
In this article we document some of the ways in 
which the suppression of young people’s participation 
in social action that falls outside the field of electoral 
politics constitutes an attempt to criminalize their poli-
tics. What does the criminalization of dissent involve? 
How is this response by the state and other key play-
ers, e.g. education institutions, mainstream media, 
corporate interests etc. best understood or explained? 
How do moves to criminalize political action align with 
the formal commitments Canada and Spain have 
made to protect and promote civil rights and freedoms 
like the right to free assembly and expression? 
In what follows we begin with an account of what 
we mean by criminalization. We then address the 
questions above with a brief account of the protests 
in Spain and Canada 2010-12. We then highlight the 
key aspects of the suppression of the expression 
of democratic rights and argue that both Spain and 
Canada criminalized political participation by young 
activists. We then explain why it is that we have seen 
criminalization of youthful politics in these liberal-
democratic states.
Criminalization, dissent and young 
people 
As McNamara et. al (2018) argue, any account of 
criminalization ought to acknowledge the variety of 
forms it can take, and the variety of meanings attrib-
uted to it. In acknowledging this variety, we do not 
suggest it can or should be used in vague or impre-
cise ways. On the contrary we argue that recognizing 
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the different way criminalization is understood and 
the different forms of practice involved needs, among 
other things, to be mindful of the specific historical 
context. This is the opposite to the vagueness which 
accompanies the failure to make such distinctions. 
Our task here is not to adjudicate the correct mean-
ing of the concept, but simply to acknowledge the dif-
ferent forms it takes in different contexts. 
With this in mind, when we speak of criminaliza-
tion, we refer to the use of a nation’s criminal jus-
tice codes, as well as its criminal justice and policing 
systems to represent and regard certain activities as 
unlawful or criminal. In effect, much of the study of 
criminalization to date has been concerned with trac-
ing the use of old laws and the passing of new leg-
islation. In some cases, as Zedner (2009) observes, 
this includes the use of coercion, for instance the de-
privation of liberty to prevent criminal acts from taking 
place. This ‘preventive justice’ model bypasses the 
established idea behind most criminal justice models 
that certain acts are only seen as a criminal offence 
only after they have occurred. Preventive justice in-
volves coercive interventions before a criminal act 
takes place. Criminalization can also include ‘softer’, 
but just as effective informal practices including the 
expanded use of surveillance technologies. 
If we turn specifically to the criminalization of dis-
sent, it can be seen that it relies on various old laws, 
many of which date back to the middle ages or to 
the renaissance, and rely on discursive categories 
such as ‘public order’, ‘riot’, ’defamation’, ‘libel’, ‘es-
pionage’ ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. The criminalization 
of dissent also depends on the extension of those 
criminal laws as governments modify them and pass 
new laws addressing ‘anti-social behavior’, denial-
of-service activism by on-line activists, ‘hacking’ and 
‘whistleblowing’. It can also include the use of inter-
vention orders, and in the case of Spain, various ‘gag 
laws’ that target certain kinds of speech deemed by 
the state to be offensive or hurtful. Governments may 
also exercise their ‘emergency powers’ by declaring 
public order emergencies and enacting emergen-
cies laws like ‘Bill 78’ passed by the Quebec National 
Assembly in May 2012, a reaction by the state to 
student protests over fee increases. The criminaliza-
tion of political dissent can also involve, particularly 
after 9/11, the introduction and augmentation of ‘anti-
terrorism’ legislation in ways that expand the state’s 
powers to interrogate and detain suspects. 
The state can also criminalize dissent by using 
a combination of traditional techniques of policing, 
for example various practices ranging from the use 
of summary offences and the issue of cautions and 
fines, through to mounted horse and baton charges 
and the mass arrest of protestors. We also see new 
techniques of physical suppression such as tear gas, 
water-cannon, ‘kettling’, through to electronic surveil-
lance and undercover infiltration of groups by police 
operatives. As Chamayou (2014) argues, this draws 
on unprecedented possibilities for surveillance of 
new social media technologies (e.g. Facebook and 
Twitter) also used by activists to disseminate infor-
mation and to mobilize activism. In many cases gov-
ernments can also rely on cooperation by agencies, 
such as universities and schools, to discipline young 
activists by using internal disciplinary procedures in-
volving formal hearings through to summary expul-
sion from the educational institution. 
The criminalization of dissent also entails the use 
of negative public representations of protestors and 
activists by state actors and compliant media outlets. 
Weber, and also Bourdieu (2014:7-9), highlighted 
the role of the state as a site of legitimate coercive 
violence, as well as its hegemony over symbolic vio-
lence. This typically involves official spokespeople 
representing the political actions of some groups or 
individuals as, for example, ‘hypocrites’ who compro-
mise other citizens’ civil or political rights, as ‘crimi-
nals’ who pose a threat to ‘community welfare’, or as 
potential or actual ‘terrorists’ who are a risk to ‘na-
tional security’.
When young people act politically and do so in 
ways that breach the legitimate or ‘appropriate’ forms 
promoted by state agencies, civics experts or ‘youth 
round-tables’, their action is typically accompanied 
by expressions of long standing ‘respectable’ fears 
about how ‘the young’ are socially irresponsible, de-
viant or defiant (Stanley Hall 1905; Pearson 1983). 
In this way, the criminalization of dissent, especially 
when it involves young people, typically involves a 
‘politics of (mis)recognition’ (Taylor 1992). 
The systematic misrecognition of young people as 
incapable of legitimate political action is often used to 
justify and inform the criminalization process. Such 
representations, when applied to young people, are 
especially powerful as they draw on long-standing 
representations of ‘youth’ as ‘folk-devils’ (Cohen 
1972) yet to be fully ‘socialized’ and characterized 
by ‘violence’, ‘thrill-seeking’, ‘irresponsibility’ and 
‘unruliness.’ Typically, these representations also 
run in parallel with paternalistic discourses about 
young people as ‘’vulnerable’, ‘in need of care’ and 
‘protection’, both from themselves and, in the case 
of young activists, they are said to need protection 
from ‘radical’, ‘dangerous’, and manipulative adult 
influences. Either way, ‘youth’ require close gover-
nance for ‘their own good’ and for the good-safety 
of the community. These popular stereotypes in turn 
affect how young people are situated in the pub-
lic sphere. They are powerful discursive practices 
that also feed directly into, and inform, criminaliza-
tion processes. Against this theoretical backdrop, in 
the following case studies, we outline how Spain’s 
Indignados and Quebec’s ‘Maple Spring’ protests 
developed, and how the state criminalized dissent 
in these contexts.
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The Indignados in Spain, 2011
Spain’s Indignados, also known as the 15-M 
Movement, began on 15 May 2011 with demonstra-
tions in over 70 Spanish cities. The movement was 
initiated by and relied on social networks.3 It was 
a response to both the 2008 economic crisis and 
moves by Spanish governments to impose austerity 
policies. The Indignados’ action was motivated by a 
strong sense of disillusionment with Spain’s govern-
ment and its power elite. Participants were moved 
by moral emotions such as righteous anger over 
the austerity policies, endemic official corruption, 
growing inequality, high youth unemployment and 
diminishing opportunities for young people. Young 
people in particular had been adversely affected 
by decades of neoliberal policies and growing ‘pre-
carization’ (Bessant et al. 2017).4
It is estimated that between 6-8.5 million Spaniards 
engaged in these protests5, underscoring the move-
ment’s significance as a major contemporary ex-
pression of dissent. After the first demonstration in 
Madrid, groups of protesters stayed in Puerta del Sol 
and engaged in civil disobedience by occupying the 
city square, setting up camps and organizing daily 
assemblies to discuss political issues such as the 
value of genuine participation, the need for a gov-
ernment free from corruption, social justice issues re-
lated to education, employment and housing, politics 
and the future of the capitalist economy (Calvo 2013, 
Castañeda 2012: 3–4). As Calvo (2013: 237) argued, 
this was a movement that ‘emerged from a gener-
alized and widely shared feeling of discontent with 
fundamental elements of the political and economic 
systems’ and for this reason it enjoyed popular sup-
port (see also Van de Velde 2011: 283–287).
The first major wave of action occurred between 
mid-May and June 2011, focusing on consciousness-
raising, promoting political debate in the streets, and 
staging occupations (Calvo 2013, Eklundh 2014: 
223–235). According to Calvo, given that Spanish 
political culture is generally recognized as apathetic 
and that this is particularly prominent in respect to 
young people, the Indignados movement was a ‘re-
markable disruption’ as ‘discontent is seldom trans-
lated into sustained collective protest’ and ‘traditional 
social movements are currently unable to bring pro-
testers to the streets…’ (Calvo 2013: 239). 
The 15-M movement succeeded in mobilizing 
large sections of the population by employing strat-
egies borrowed from Anonymous and by enacting 
collaborative non-hierarchical leadership, flat deci-
sion-making and more genuinely democratic and 
inclusive practices that liberate the political voice of 
young disenfranchised people. In these ways, the 
Indignados movement represented an attempt by 
young Spaniards to peacefully protest against what 
they saw as bad government, and in doing so to fix 
the broken economic and political systems marred 
by corruption and a failure to provide opportunities 
for young people (Calvo 2013: 240). Innovations that 
also help explain the Indignados’ success were the 
movement’s occupation of many urban spaces, a 
strategy that reached out to and resonated with many 
people, and its closely targeted opposition to the en-
tire ‘establishment’ that had failed an entire genera-
tion of young people (Calvo 2013). 
Maple Spring: Quebec Student 
Protests, 2012
The Quebec student protests which began in 
February 2012 and ended in September 2012 were 
a reaction to the Charest Liberal government’s pro-
posed increases in university tuition fees announced 
originally in March 2011. It can also be seen as part of 
a larger response to austerity policies enacted by gov-
ernments around the globe. Like Spain’s Indignados, 
Quebec’s students involved in the campaigns used 
unmediated democratic and on-line communication 
to foster horizontal relations and to harness and sus-
tain political momentum during the actions. 
Social media played a key role in disseminating 
student claims and in mobilizing protest. That action 
included a series of mass rallies involving 400,000 
protestors in March 2012 in Montreal as well as a 
decision taken by three-quarters of Quebec’s univer-
sity students to boycott classes, a strike that ran from 
March to September 2012. 
In both cases ostensibly liberal-democratic gov-
ernments reacted with a suite of measures designed 
to suppress dissent by criminalizing it.
Suppression of Youth Protest: Spain 
In Spain the criminalization of young people’s par-
ticipation in politics was evident in the enactment of 
the ‘Law on the Protection of Public Safety’, as well 
as in the broad Penal Code reforms that carried se-
vere sanctions for protestors (González-Sánchez and 
Maroto-Calatayud 2018)6. Additionally, police powers 
increased, allowing them to require identification, car-
ry out ‘stop and search’ practices, and issue fines to 
deter protestors. This was accompanied by discours-
es that constructed young protestors in ways that 
delegitimized their actions. González-Sánchez and 
Maroto-Calatayud (2018) note how the law reforms 
were specifically designed to (re)define certain activi-
ties - hitherto seen to be lawful - as illegal (Bessant 
2017: 2014-221). These actions can thus be seen as 
forming part of a neoliberal agenda intended to invali-
date issues raised by opponents of the labor market 
reforms and anti-austerity policies. In this way, as they 
argue, criminalization of the dissent was symbolic 
and material and intended to reaffirm the neoliberal 
rhetoric of the state as disinterested in redistribution 
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demonstrations against austerity measures pro-
voked a strong response from the state and univer-
sity managements. 
Apart from some heavy-handed and occasionally 
violent police tactics used to disrupt marches and 
rallies during the ‘Maple Spring’, Quebec’s Liberal 
government chiefly responded by suspending basic 
political rights to freedom of expression, assembly 
and dissent. As the action continued, we saw unsuc-
cessful attempts by the state to use legal instruments 
like injunctions or safeguard orders that nullified stu-
dent rights of association. By May 2012, student pro-
testors were being arrested by armed police on the 
grounds that protest was illegal (Peñafiel and Doran 
2017: 349-373; Salter 2011: 211-238). In May 2012, 
the Charest government passed Bill 78 - an emer-
gency law banning picketing or protesting near uni-
versity grounds, restricting the right to strike of uni-
versity employees, and requiring police approval for 
any public protests in Quebec (Peñafiel and Doran 
2017:71-89). As Chicoine (2018:62) observed, the 
Charest government also transferred responsibility 
for managing the student protests over to Quebec 
university administrators:
The … new aggressive tactics used by the university 
to repress students was wide ranging: omnipresent 
on campus video surveillance, intimidating private 
security guards—sometimes dressed in civilian 
clothes— injunctions, social media monitoring, 
pre-emptive disciplinary measures against student 
leaders, mass arrests… (Chicoine 2018: 6).
Amongst the moves to criminalize dissent was 
the government’s declaration that student protests 
were improper, even a form of ‘criminal violence’, a 
ploy intended to de-legitimize and discredit the ac-
tion as legitimate political action. Other illiberal gov-
ernment techniques included denying students the 
right to strike, which saw the state erase from their 
language the use of “strike” and replace it with the 
category “boycott”. As in the Spanish case, this dis-
cursive ploy constituted a form of symbolic violence 
that denied the legitimacy and value of the student 
protests against austerity policies - reframing student 
‘boycotts’ as the complaints of ‘spoiled brats’ who 
were not prepared to make the necessary financial 
sacrifices being endured by everyone else. 
Chicoine (2018) documents how different govern-
ments enacted laws that actively prevented students 
from ‘impeding’ the education of their peers, while at 
the same time teachers’ unions were barred from par-
ticipating in actions with students that might ‘impede’ 
their education. The Quebec liberal government also 
introduced a new law in 2012 -the “bludgeon law” - 
that required the people of Quebec to report to police 
any gatherings of more than 50 people and to notify 
of any protest plans, as well as to keep clear of cam-
puses and not to disrupt classes. The penalties for in-
fringing these requirements included hefty fines (see 
and welfare and focused on state security (González-
Sánchez and Maroto-Calatayud 2018). 
As González-Sánchez and Maroto-Calatayud 
(2018) argue, protection was also extended to private 
security agencies if they were cooperating with au-
thorities. New offences such as ‘breaching peace by 
acting in groups’ were created through legislative re-
form that specifically targeted collective actions such 
as political demonstrations (and carried a sentence 
of up to 6 years). 
The ‘distribution or public diffusion, through any 
means, of messages … which incite the commission 
of any crime of public order disturbance’ was crimi-
nalized. This meant the act of communicating any in-
formation about a public demonstration that became 
‘violent’ could be deemed an offence and a new 
crime. Legislation against ‘invasion against the will 
of its owner’ of any office of public or private services 
was also enacted (González-Sánchez and Maroto-
Calatayud 2018). 
‘Criminal misdemeanors’ that did not lead to jail 
sentences or criminal records were removed. ‘Minor 
offences’ (such as disobeying a police officer) were 
introduced, entailing prison sentences and a crimi-
nal record, as well as generally harsher punish-
ments. These moves gave police greater discretion 
and the authority to sanction political resistance by 
describing it as ‘resistance to authority’ or a ‘breach 
of the peace’ (González-Sánchez and Maroto-
Calatayud 2018). 
At the same time, key government figures de-
ployed rhetorical techniques to frame young people 
involved in action as a danger to social order, as ‘anti-
establishment collectives’ intent on destabilizing ‘the 
institutional system’. By redefining political protest as 
criminal and subversive, those in positions of author-
ity were able to represent young activists as engaged 
in non-political action. Rather, they were now disor-
derly, criminal and violent, even though the move-
ment was committed to non-violent civil disobedience 
for political democratic rights (González-Sánchez 
and Maroto-Calatayud 2018).
This discourse about radical illegality vs demo-
cratic citizens participating in political expression was 
used to justify harsh police interventions in demon-
strations, as well as the use of force to disperse pro-
testors (González-Sánchez and Maroto-Calatayud 
2018). In this way, the same demonstration that would 
have been a democratic practice was now redefined 
as criminal and punishable (González-Sánchez and 
Maroto-Calatayud 2018). 
Suppression of Protests: Canada 
Student strikes in Québec in 2012 began as pro-
tests against increases in university fees before 
evolving into more general action. These student 
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also Peñafiel and Doran 2017). Student political ac-
tion was also criminalized through the use of bylaws 
like Montréal’s bylaw P-6 that banned the wearing of 
masks. It also required those organizing the action to 
provide itineraries of their plans and 24 hours’ notice. 
From 2011 many students were investigated by 
government intelligence agencies and some ar-
rested on the grounds that they were dangerous po-
litical agents (e.g. extremists, anarchist and leftists). 
Representing students as threats worked to legiti-
mize police action against students and discredit the 
students’ actions as lawful political action.
Police practices such as containment or ‘kettling’ 
were also deployed during ‘Maple Spring’, a con-
trol technique that saw uniformed officers enclose 
groups of people, often for hours, thereby curtailing 
the protest, and - for some- acting as a deterrent for 
further engagement. This was particularly the effec-
tive when that containment was accompanied by po-
lice use of restraints, e.g. handcuffs and fines. Added 
to this was the deployment of ‘riot’ control ‘weapons’ 
such as pepper spray, tear gas, and acoustic devices 
(sound bombs) to disperse groups.
Legislative reforms also worked to ensure uni-
versity senior managers and teachers ran classes 
regardless of access to their classes being blocked. 
As Chicoine (2018) documents, this gave manag-
ers two options: to disobey the law or to call the 
police to remove students blocking access to the 
classes. In the case of Université de Montréal, ad-
ministrators complied and called police, leading to 
two days of violent clashes between the ‘riot police’ 
and students on the campus. By 2015 conflict es-
calated with the use of force as the first response, 
rather than any “negotiated management approach” 
(Chicoine 2018: 62-76).
In the next sections, we now turn to the task of 
interpreting or trying to understand the criminaliza-
tion of young people’s politics by states that identify 
themselves as liberal democracies. 
Explaining Moves to Criminalize 
Young People’s Politics 
The rise of neoliberalism from the late 1970s on-
wards helps to explain specific changes in govern-
ment policy which impacted differently, but in par-
ticularly adverse ways on young people (Bessant 
et.al 2017). Decades of neoliberal thinking saw 
governments systematically withdraw from mitigat-
ing the serious consequences and contradictions of 
capitalist market economies. In this context, political 
and economic elites in liberal democracies identified 
themselves as ‘modernizers’, as new democrats or 
advocates of the ‘Third Way’: all euphemisms for de-
regulation, privatization, and a more corporate public 
service. Moreover, given that neoliberals rely on neo-
classical economics, the world is filtered through an 
economic lens giving everything an economic value. 
Thus, every person becomes a ‘market actor’ or ‘cus-
tomer’, and every human action and institution be-
comes a ‘market’ or a commercial practice. Even the 
state is turned into ‘a firm’ that needs to be kept free 
from outside ‘interference’ (Brown 2015:1). 
As Harvey (2005: 3) observed, while neoliberals 
claim they are engaged in an economic project that 
needs to be separate from the state, it is in fact a 
deeply political project reliant on significant and con-
tinual state intervention. This includes the use of crim-
inal law and policing to secure their interests against 
threats like those posed by young people presenting 
alternatives to the prevailing economic order. 
Another feature of neoliberalism that helps explain, 
at least in part, the criminalization of young people’s 
politics, relates to the active discouragement of poli-
tics. While consensus is encouraged, politics and 
dissent are discouraged courtesy of various de-polit-
icization strategies, such as the idea that the market 
is neutral – a political site where social and political 
relations are shaped by market-economic relations 
forging economic citizens or customers. 
The competitive logic of the market also works 
to depoliticize and diminish ‘the public’ by remov-
ing debate about certain issues from the public 
sphere to the private domain; this is an efficiency 
that helps with the implementation of the neoliberal 
agenda (Brown 2015). Debates about matters like 
how to run society, what sort of society we want, and 
what public goods should be protected, have - with 
the rise of neoliberalism - been constrained, and in 
many cases rendered silent. Indeed, any attempts 
to have a comprehensive debate and to question 
the authority of the intellectual edifice informing 
dominant socio-economic practices are closed off 
because such an examination will reveal it is seri-
ously flawed and not working, and indeed is a pri-
mary cause of the growing disaffection and hardship 
experienced by many people. 
Closing off debate and avoiding significant critique 
ensures the range of viable options to the neoliberal 
agenda remain limited, so things do not change in 
substantial ways. As Brown (2015) argues, neolib-
eral rationality as a mode of government works to 
economize democracy itself. This is what privati-
zation, deregulation and ‘contracting out’ of public 
services do by reducing democratic accountability 
and by using commercial-in-confidence caveats on 
private-public partnership contracts, Moreover, the 
constraining and often silencing debate by limiting 
discussion about substantive political issues to a 
range of narrowly economic considerations like ‘ef-
ficiency’ ‘contestability’ or ‘competition’ occurs side-
by-side with the use of customer satisfaction sur-
veys as measures of ‘effectiveness’. As the public 
sphere shrinks, avenues for opposition and dissent 
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are restricted and closed down. These are trends 
that block opportunities for young people and others 
to mobilize themselves politically and collectively to 
challenge certain policies and practices within their 
societies (Bessant et.al, 2017). 
Under the sway of neoliberalism, this shrinkage of 
the public sphere has also been supported by moves 
to frame political contest and civil disobedience as 
security risks through criminalizing and pathologizing 
young people and others taking part in them. In these 
ways, ‘politics’ becomes a problem which is respond-
ed to by reframing what is happening. Representing 
democratic debate in the form of ’alternative political 
action’ as something dangerous means ‘the solution’ 
and appropriate state response is clear. As a danger, 
the proper response is ‘obvious’: it is to mitigate the 
risks or danger by whatever means, rather than ad-
dressing the causes of the ‘discontent.’ In this way, 
democratic debate is shut down and key political 
freedoms such as the right to free speech and as-
sembly become restricted and undermined. 
We also note a consensus in the literature ob-
serves how since the late twentieth century with the 
rollout of neoliberalism popular anxiety about crime 
across the globe increased significantly. Increasing 
public anxiety about crime was used to justify the in-
tensification of official reactions (Garland 2001). It in-
cluded further increased government supported ‘law 
and order’ campaigns, accompanied by state preoc-
cupation with the idea of risk and the need for ‘risk 
governance.’ This is evidenced, for example, by the 
increased reliance by the state on surveillance tech-
nologies, on their growing use of different policing 
measures, and a rising punitive culture that fosters 
a more authoritarian approach to offence and crime 
(Muncie 2006 :107-121). 
The idea of terrorism
Popular concern about terrorism and security 
increased as governments began developing and 
implementing measures ostensibly designed to 
secure public safety, to protect citizens and ‘the 
homeland’. While we cannot specify the exact 
date, writers like Aoude observe that it was follow-
ing11th September 2001, when a series of terrorist 
attacks against the USA marked the beginning of a 
contemporary life of ‘a permanent fear of terrorism’ 
(2002). The 9/11 attacks soon led to an American-
led ‘war on terror’ and the accompanying calls to 
sacrifice various democratic rights in the name of 
national and global security. 
Soon after, many western states began shifting the 
presumed ‘balance’ between democratic values and 
security towards security as they systematically sur-
rendered civil liberties and human rights. According 
to some legal experts, this generated concern about 
the future of the rule of law and liberal democratic 
institutions in the ‘war on terror’ (Hogg 2007: 84). 
For Hocking (2003: 371), since 2001, such develop-
ments facilitated ‘the preemptive control of political 
conflict and dissent, which may or may not protect 
individual citizens, but which certainly protects the 
state itself’. In this context, we have witnessed in-
creases in the criminalization of street-based pro-
tests or public assembly in countries like the UK 
France, Canada and USA (International Network of 
Civil Liberties Organizations INCLO 2013; Pickard 
and Bessant 2018). 
This included the enactment and regular use of 
‘anti-terror’ legislation. In this context the ‘threat’ of 
terrorism ‘justified’ the deployment of mass police 
action and anti-personnel weapons against civil-
ians, and extended police powers to stop, search 
and detain without a warrant or formal arrest, to 
restrict protests, dissent assembly and industrial 
action. In places like Australia, in October 2015, 
children as young as 14 became subject to control 
orders when the then-liberal Turnbull Government 
amended the Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 (Cth) 
giving federal courts the power to unilaterally make 
control orders under Div 104 of the Criminal Code in 
response to a request from the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP). It was another example of the many 
moves that have heightened concern about a di-
minishing valuing of human rights and democratic 
values in favor of security.
The ‘Civilizing Offensive’
Young people have long been recognized in the 
official and popular imagination as a section of the 
population requiring close management (Rose 1990). 
Rather than such ageist views abating, they have in-
tensified especially since 9/11 leading to repressive 
action against young people as they exercise their 
political agency.
The German historical-sociologist Norbert Elias 
(1969; 1982) developed the idea of a ‘civilizing pro-
cess’ in his account of Europeans’ thousand-year 
development of practices of disciplining and regulat-
ing their own and others biological and emotional im-
pulses. Later writers, such as Powell (2013), Mitzman 
(1987), Verrips (1987), van Ginkel (1996) and van 
Krieken (1999), developed Elias’ account of the ‘civi-
lizing process’ to talk about what they called the bour-
geois ‘civilizing offensive’. It refers to the practice of 
targeting behavior deemed by those in authority to be 
immoral, uncivilized and threatening, and involves ef-
forts by government state agencies and non-govern-
ment organizations to defend the state from ‘barbaric’ 
forces by drawing on the rationalization and central-
ization of power of the state, to target behavior consid-
ered ‘immoral’ or ‘uncivilized’ (Gerth and Mills 1946).
Moreover, as Neocleous (2000) argues, when pre-
sented with the option of ‘security’ or ‘barbarism’ we 
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are invited to identify security as a good thing to which 
a ‘rational society should aspire’. Thus ‘civilizing of-
fensive’ is a framework that helps in understanding 
moves by liberal governments to criminalize politics 
when enacted by young people in ways described 
above. As a civilizing process or political technique, 
transforming certain actions or people into a security 
issue that puts at risk ‘civilization’ and threatening to 
return us to barbarity represents an ‘existential threat 
in the form of the enemy’ that works to justify ‘actions 
by the state that fall ‘outside the normal bounds of 
legal and political procedure’ (see also van Krieken 
2006, Mitzman 1987: 663-687. 
In this way the criminalization of certain forms of 
politics can be seen as exemplifying a ‘civilizing of-
fensive’ where state actions are performed to ensure 
that those who the government and powerful groups 
identify as problematic population (e.g. the youthful 
rebellious rabble) are ‘elevated’ from their ‘ignorance’ 
and incivility by means of whatever it takes, whether 
that be use of police and military violence, education 
or ‘welfare policy’. 
Conclusion
It is generally recognized that young people’s dis-
engagement from electoral politics is a major problem 
for liberal-democratic states (Grasso 2016). Without 
significant popular participation, democratic govern-
ment loses its legitimacy. This explains why many 
governments and civil society organizations since the 
1990s have moved to encourage political participa-
tion by young people through various means, includ-
ing advertising campaigns, civic education programs 
in schools, ‘youth roundtables’, youth councils, ‘youth 
consultations’ and the like. This highlights a paradox 
when those same liberal-democratic governments 
also stigmatize and criminalize young people who 
engage in social movements, protest activity and 
other forms of non-electoral politics. 
When the politics of young people is deemed to 
lack the legitimacy conferred on conventional politi-
cal activity like electoral processes, state hostility to 
it becomes a normal position. Young people’s politi-
cal activism and conventional state responses to that 
political activism highlight the contradictory charac-
ter of liberal-democratic politics, such as the serious 
contradictions operating in the respective ‘liberal’ and 
the ‘democratic’ characteristics that are supposed to 
merge into a liberal-democracy. 
Those contradictions can be found in the intersec-
tion between liberalism’s commitment to the rule of 
law and the promotion and protection of basic rights 
to freedom of belief, speech, and assembly, and de-
mocracy’s claim that its legitimacy is vested in popu-
lar consent and the democratic principle of majori-
tarian rule. However, the majoritarian principle can 
also mean that minorities are subject to the denial of 
their rights and liberties by the majority. Equally the 
resolve to apply the rule of law (found for example in 
a constitution or a Bill of Rights) can mean that demo-
cratic governments can have their legislation or poli-
cies lawfully challenged and overturned by courts. In 
these ways, liberalism is always in tension with de-
mocracy and vice versa. 
There are also major tensions within liberalism 
itself. For example, there is a tradition of liberal 
thought that promotes and protects the freedom 
of all. However, the apparent privileging of liberty 
seems to be a flexible commitment when state polic-
ing and security agencies argue that these rights and 
liberties have to be by-passed in order to promote 
the security of the community. Following Neocleous 
(2007: 131-149), we can go further and argue that 
once a threat to the security of the state or commu-
nity exists, then any incompatibility or tension be-
tween those objectives is always resolved in favor 
of state security. It is the default setting in the lib-
eral order. In short, liberties like freedom of speech 
and assembly are always trumped by the security 
imperative. The fact that this occurs even in places 
like universities, sites where critical thinking and en-
gagement are apparently encouraged, suggest that 
a non-resolvable contradiction exists between two 
competing objectives (security and liberty). 
The two cases discussed in this article are neither 
isolated nor exceptional cases. As a growing body 
of literature demonstrates, liberal-democratic states 
normally use criminal law along with other policing 
and surveillance measures to regulate, constrain and 
suppress political activities which liberal-democracies 
claim they are committed to protecting and promot-
ing. This is especially true when social movements 
and political activism raise significant and uncomfort-
able questions about the practices of government 
and/or power elites (Grasso and Bessant 2018).
The argument is that the disengagement from 
electoral politics by young people has been con-
structed as a significant problem by liberal-demo-
cratic states because without widespread participa-
tion, democratic governments cannot claim to be 
legitimate. For this reason, governments and many 
organizations have been moved to encourage youth 
political participation. 
This has created a paradox, given that the same 
liberal-democratic governments promoting young 
people’s political participation also criminalized 
young people when they engaged in certain from of 
politics. This also highlights how liberal-democratic 
states encourage political participation of young 
people in politics only if it takes certain approved 
forms (e.g. participation in electoral-party politics or 
youth roundtables etc). When young people’s poli-
tics go beyond that field, we often see hostile re-
sponses from the state. 
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In this article we argued that these tensions are in-
herent in democratic liberal states. While such states 
claim to promote and to protect freedoms, such as, 
for example, the freedom to protests, that commit-
ment is provisional. When those exercising such 
rights (freedoms) are deemed to threaten the state, 
then security always prevails over those civic rights. 
In this way we see that a non-resolvable incongruity 
is present between two competing objectives (secu-
rity and liberty). 
The two cases documented in this article also 
highlight how liberal-democratic states use criminal 
law along with various policing and surveillance mea-
sures to manage and suppress political activities that 
those same liberal-democracies declare themselves 
committed to defend. This is particularly so when the 
political action queries the authority of the political 
class or power elites.
More time and attention are needed to fully appreci-
ate why state security and policing agencies respond as 
they do when faced with large numbers of people exer-
cising those civic rights and freedoms that liberal-demo-
cratic states claim define their raison d’etre. Scholarship 
by Wilkinson (2018) highlights the role of fear, mobilized 
and then harnessed by governments exhibiting the 
traits of ‘authoritarian liberalism’. Moreover, fear of the 
possibility that young people exercising their political 
agency might be effective in articulating and offering vi-
able alternatives to the prevailing social arrangements 
also seems to play a role in the routine deployment of 
armed force by police and military personnel to repress 
such actions. As Graeber (2011) argues, a series of re-
cent social movements seemed to have posed a real 
and impending threat to the preferred business-as-usu-
al model because they hold out the promise of viable 
alternatives to what we now have. 
Notes
1. While Spain is a metropolitan European middle-power 
with a significant history as a colonial power, Canada is 
a former British (and in part) French colony. Both coun-
tries have a constitutional monarchy, and both also ex-
perience significant internal political divisions related 
to their respective ‘national problems’ - Catalonia in 
Spain, and Quebec in Canada.
2. The metaphor of ‘gag’ in the reference to ‘gag laws’ re-
fers to the muzzling of certain kinds of speech enacted 
by legislation or policies making it illegal to speak about 
particular matters. Gag laws can also make it legal for 
governments to surveil citizens by creating personal 
background profiles on them and imposing penalties 
on actions deemed to breach these laws. The Spanish 
Government’s Citizens Security law of 2015 came to 
be referred to as the ‘Gag Law’ and was seen by its 
critics as the biggest threat to democratic rights since 
the Franco era. Reportedly, the majority of Spaniards 
(82%) opposed the law. The incongruity was not lost on 
Diaz and his supporters (Bessant 2017). 
3. e.g. Democracia Real YA (‘Real Democracy NOW’) or 
Juventud Sin Futuro (‘Youth without a Future’).
4. Neoliberalism refers to the contemporary political 
project designed to ‘roll back the state’ through a 
combination of privatization and deregulation while 
using individualist competitive market mechanisms to 
provide public goods or services like health, educa-
tion and community services. Key neoliberal policy 
ideas include prioritizing ‘freedom’ over equality, stig-
matizing state welfare recipients and cutting personal 
and corporate income tax rates. Neoliberal govern-
ments regularly also provide significant amounts of 
money in the form of tax-breaks, subsidies, incen-
tives and bailouts to business and high-income earn-
ers (Bessant et al. 2017).
5. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20110806/mas-seis-
millones-espanoles-han-participado-movimiento-
15m/452598.shtml 
6. The Spanish parliament passed three laws in 2015 
to regulate public order: the penal code, law of public 
safety and the law of private security in the aftermath 
of the anti-austerity mobilizations (González-Sánchez 
and Maroto-Calatayud 2018). The revision of ‘crimes 
of assault against persons in authority’ saw resistance 
criminalized: the throwing of blunt objects was rede-
fined as ‘ ‘potentially dangerous to life’ and described 
as ‘aggravated assault’ carrying a penalty of up to 
9 years in prison (González-Sánchez and Maroto-
Calatayud 2018). 
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